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Abstract 
This paper considers the APEC and proposed EGA agreements which grant tariff concession in favor 
of "green" goods. We …find that the practical significance of the APEC agreement should not be 
overestimated as it involves modest tariff concessions over a subset of goods which are not heavily 
traded. Still, these agreements involve a paradigm shift to the extent that they use tariffs concessions 
negotiated on a plurilateral basis as a policy instrument to meet public policy concern, instead of 
making market access conditional on meeting national regulations. We model the mechanism through 
which these tariff preferences provide incentives to change production in favor of green goods in 
exporting countries and highlight the challenges that the implementation of these agreements involve. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction1
This paper focuses on the recent (plurilateral) initiatives to reduce tariﬀs on
“environmental” or "green" goods. There are two iniatives on this front; ﬁrst,
the APEC (Asian Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation) initiative which involves a
voluntary reduction of tariﬀs across 21 WTO members2 and 54 HS 6 products
categories, and second, the EGA (Environmental Goods Agreement) in which
a number of other WTO members attempt to include tariﬀ reductions on the
APEC list of products in their schedules of concessions.
In these agreements, participating countries create new subcategories of
products that are meant to be environmentally friendly (so called, "ex outs")
within HS categories and provide lower tariﬀs for these products. For instance,
a new subcategory labeled solar heaters was introduced among the category of
‘instantaneous or storage water heaters’ ( HS 841919). The tariﬀ applied to
this subcategory is lower than the tariﬀ applied to others goods in the six digit
category, reﬂecting the objective to encourage the imports of environmentally
friendly goods. APEC target was to ensure that signatories would reduce duties
for the listed goods to maximum 5% ad valorem.
APEC members have now, in large part, implemented the agreed tariﬀ re-
ductions and apply them on a most favored nation (MFN) basis (i.e. without
discrimination). The EGA negotiations are, at the time of writing, still in-
conclusive. These initiatives raise important issues from a number of diﬀerent
perspectives.
First, this is (possibly) a change of paradigm with respect to the motivation
underlying the determination of tariﬀs. The prevailing view is that tariﬀs
are determined within the GATT/WTO as an exchange of market access which
improves on the outcome of unilateral tariﬀ setting which otherwize optimise the
terms of trade. Each country reduces tariﬀs below what would be (unilaterally)
optimal for some imports in exchange for a reduction of the tariﬀ that trading
partners would apply to its exports. The APEC and EGA intiatives introduce
environmental protection as another motivation when deciding on the level of
tariﬀs. But nothing would prevent to modulate tariﬀs according to other public
policy concerns.
By the same token, the APEC and EGA agreement might represent a para-
digm shift with respect to the way in which public policy concerns are dealt with
in the GATT/WTO. The GATT discipline was, for all practical purposes, a tar-
iﬀ bargain with insurance against concession erosion that might arise because
1We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown, Henrik Horn, Doug Irwin, Bob
Staiger, and Alan Sykes for helpful comments on previous drafts. Daniele Rinaldo
provided excellent research assistance and in many ways is our shadow co-author. Suja
Rishikesh, Marc Bacchetta, Adelina Nenette C. Mendoza, Florian Eberth, and Carsten
Steinfatt at the WTO very generously shared their expertise on trade date and the nego-
tiations with us. The ﬁnancial support of the European University Institute is gratefully
acknowledged.
2Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
Thailand, USA, Vietnam
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of domestic regulations, possibly reﬂecting legitimate public policy concerns.
Tariﬀs would be curbed through ‘tariﬀ bindings’ (tariﬀ concessions), a promise
to the eﬀect that the level of tariﬀs would not increase above and beyond a
multilaterally agreed threshold. Concession erosion would be adressed by the
commitment that domestic policies, e.g., policies applied to domestic goods and
imported goods after customs clearance, should be applied in nondiscrimina-
tory manner. Since domestic policies were unilaterally deﬁned (as opposed to
tariﬀs that were multilaterally negotiated), nondiscrimination would guaran-
tee that trading nations would not be in position to provide domestic goods
with an advantage beyond that embedded in tariﬀ protection. For instance,
domestic policies in favor of the environement should not discriminate in favor
of domestic goods. Nonviolation complaints is an additional, GATT idiosyn-
cratic, element that protects concessions, allowing aﬀected trading nations to
request compensation for lost (expected) trade resulting from otherwise GATT-
consistent measures. The rationale for this approach was that the GATT con-
tract was (necessarily) incomplete, and a number of policies that had not found
their way into the contract explicitly could (negatively) aﬀect the value of tariﬀ
concessions. The best example of successful nonviolation complaints concerns
litigation against subsidies, an instrument that only gradually came under the
multilateral disciplines.
Hence, whereas environmental protection normally takes the form of reg-
ulation for which trading nations have discretion subject to the discipline of
non discrimination, the APEC and the EGA approaches it through tariﬀ pref-
erences. We discuss the consequences of such an approach for domestic and
foreign ﬁrms below, in the context of a simple model which emphasizes the
incentive to develop new green goods.
The paper is organised a follows. Section 2 provides further background on
the APEC and EGA agreements. Section 3 provides an overview of the outcome
of APEC negotiations. We ﬁnd that there are only 14 countries (out of 21) for
which the APEC agreement is relevant as some countries had nothing to adjust
in the ﬁrst place and some others did not implement any change. We also ﬁnd
that the share of trade aﬀected by the concessions is very small, mostly because
the 54 products concerned by the agreement are not heavily traded. Second,
focusing on these products, we ﬁnd that the tariﬀ preference granted under the
agreement are on average quite modest. This does not come as surprise given
that outstanding tariﬀs are generally rather low. Still, there is a great disparity
across countries; Mexico is outlier with a (trade weighted) average reduction of
tariﬀs in excess of 10%. Korea and to a lesser extent Vietnam, Russia, Canada
and China have also granted signiﬁcant concessions. At the other extremes, the
concessions are negligible for the US (as well as the Philippines and Indonesia).
Section 4 develops a simple model of tariﬀ setting in which a country can
diﬀerentiate tariﬀs that were initially set to optimise the terms of trade in order
to encourage the imports of goods that are environmentally friendly. We ﬁnd
that such a policy can encourage foreign ﬁrms to produce green variant of their
goods and that the level of tariﬀ concessions depend on cost incurred in produc-
ing these variants. We also ﬁnd that when the external beneﬁt from inducing
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the import of green goods is such that a tariﬀ preference is attractive in terms of
welfare, importing countries have an incentive to set the tariﬀ preferences at a
level such that all foreign ﬁrms produce a green variant. This arises because the
greater competition induced by further entry ensures that a smaller proportion
of the tariﬀ concession is appropriated by foreign ﬁrms.
Section 5 discusses how the APEC and EGA agreements ﬁt into the WTO
system. We discuss the motivation behind these agreements as a response to
the way in which the WTO has dealt with the issue on non discrimination and
the uncertaintly surrounding the legal status of these agreements. Section 6
concludes.
2 Background on APEC and EGA negotiations
As mentioned above, the APEC and EGA negotiations involve the deﬁnition
of tariﬀs beyond the six digit level. The approach towards the level of tar-
iﬀ concessions has changed since the early GATT days. Some WTO members
continued negotiating at the HS six-digit level, where tariﬀ lines are expressed
in a ‘regulation-neutral’ manner. Others nevertheless, have stopped doing so.
Indeed, the post-Tokyo round era marks the widespread negotiation of conces-
sions at the eight-, ten-, or twelve-digit level. At ﬁrst, it was the European
Union (EU) and the U.S. that had adopted this approach. Many industrial-
ized countries, members of the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development) have since emulated the attitude of the trans-Atlantic part-
ners. Article 3.3 of HS allows for subclassiﬁcations of the six-digit harmonized
classiﬁcations of all goods:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Contracting Party from estab-
lishing, in its Customs tariﬀ or statistical nomenclatures, subdivi-
sions classifying goods beyond the level of the Harmonized system,
provided that any such subdivision is added and coded at a level
beyond that of the six-digit numerical code set out in the Annex to
this Convention.
Subclassiﬁcations can be unilateral (the majority of times so far), plurilateral
or multilateral. The negotiation of the APEC list is the ﬁrst plurilateral eﬀort.
Importantly, however, the subcategories are not (so far) harmonised, so that dif-
ferent countries have diﬀerent subcategories. Countries can thus express their
societal preferences through elaborate tariﬀ lines instead of regulation. The
original (pre-EGA) unilateral recourse towards elaborate classiﬁcations is to
some extent paradoxical, as the whole purpose of the ‘Brussels Nomenclature’,
and the Harmonized System (HS) that it led to, was to introduce a common
language to describe goods on which tariﬀ concessions would be subsequently
negotiated. It was felt nevertheless, that a balance had to be struck between
uniform tariﬀ descriptions, and “breathing” space for those trading nations that
produced wider range of goods and their varieties. The APEC and EGA ne-
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gotiations are an application of the possibility oﬀered through Article 3.3 of
HS.
Vossenaar (2014) and (2016) provides a very comprehensive discussion of the
negotiation of the APEC list of environmental goods. The 21 APEC members
essentially pledged that the tariﬀ imposed on various environmental goods would
not exceed 5% by the end of 2015. The APEC negotiators worked on the basis of
HS commitments and had to devise “ex outs”, that is, subheadings that covered
environmental goods only out of a wider category, which as mentioned above,
might diﬀer across countries3 . The APEC tariﬀ reductions have not, at the
moment of writing, been incorporated into national schedules. APEC members
apply them on voluntary basis. As already stated supra, they are applied on an
MFN-basis4 .
In 2014, 14 WTO members (counting the EU as one5) initiated the EGA
negotiations. The number of negotiators has now risen to 18, representing 46
members. Negotiations were supposed to wrap up by December 2016. Recently,
the two co-chairs, Mike Froman (US), and Cecilia Malmstrom (EU), issued a
statement to the eﬀect that negotiations had failed to conclude. The process is
now frozen but it does not mean that EGA has been abandonned and negotiators
are contemplating the next steps6 . Failure to conclude the EGA though, has
not led to revocation of the APEC concessions, which continue to apply. EGA
negotiators followed the APEC model of “ex outs”, as Santana (2015) explains
in his account of the ﬁrst phase of talks.
Finally, it is striking that the APEC ex outs have been used to enhance
environmental protection at home by improving access to "green" goods but
not to enhance environmental protection abroad. To provide but an illustration:
there are tariﬀ lines for solar heaters (as per the APEC list), but no tariﬀ lines for
the manner in which solar heaters have been produced in the exporting market.
So, even if a foreign country produces solar heaters in the most environment-
unfriendly manner, it will still receive a low tariﬀ for exporting an environmental
good to Home. APEC countries, in other words, do not appear to be concerned
about the environmental incidence of externalities at the production level but
3The full list of products covered, as well as the ex outs, that is the products that
come under the HS 6 headings that qualify as environmental goods is accessible in
https://www.apec.org
Since ex outs are usually expressed at the eight-digit level, their numbering might diﬀer
across national schedules. The reader will have to compare national descriptions of the eight
digit headings in order to evaluate commensurability of concessions entered. On the overall
level of duties, see Bown and Irwin (2016). Hoekman and Mavroidis (2017) explain the
modalities of scheduling.
4According to the APEC reports, the commitments for Thailand and Malaysia are still
under considerations. Will not consider these two countries any further. See 2016 APEC
Economy Progress in Implementing their Commitments to Reduce Tariﬀs on the 54 Prod-
ucts in the APEC List of Environmental Goods to Five Percent by the End of 2015, 2016
CTI Report to Ministers.
5Counting the UK as part of the EU.
6There is potentially a lot at stake. For instance, the USTR estimates trade in environ-
mental goods to approximate $1 trillion in 2015 prices. The New Zealand Foreign Aﬀairs
and Trade Ministry estimates that trade in environmental goods will rise up to $3 trillion
by 2020.
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solely at the consumption stage. This feature could, of course, change in the
future, as the negotiations is still ongoing, and more ex outs can always be
devised.
3 The outcome of the APEC agreement
This section discusses the outcome of the APEC agreement. Table 1 reports on
the mean, standard deviation and median of the tariﬀs imposed by the 21 coun-
tries participating in the APEC before (in 2015) and after the agreement in the
54 product categories concerned by the agreement7 . It is immediately apparent
that the agreeement is irrelevant for Hong Kong, Japan, Peru and Singapore as
these countries did not impose any tariﬀ for the products concerned prior to the
agreement. Table 2, which reports the change in the mean and standard devi-
ation in tariﬀs following the commitments, reveals that Australia, New Zealand
and Brunei did not make any change to their tariﬀs. Hence, there are only
14 countries for which the APEC agreeement is at all relevant. The highest
reductions in average tariﬀs are found in Chile, China, Korea and Mexico, with
a reduction of roughly one percentage point. Russia (0.59) and Taiwan (0.27)
have an intermediate reduction in tariﬀs. The reduction is negligible in the US,
The Philippines and Vietnam. In any event, the reduction in the average tariﬀ
is very modest.
Table 1:
M ea n 2 0 1 5 S t d .D e v . 2 0 1 6 M ed ia n 2 0 1 5 M e a n 2 0 1 6 S t d .D e v . 2 0 1 6 .1 M ed ia n 2 0 1 6
A u s t r a l i a 2.600 2.520 5 2.600 2.520 5
B ru n e i 1.970 2.450 0 1.970 2.450 0
C a n a d a 0.360 1.350 0 0.260 1.150 0
C h i l e 6 0 6 5 0 5
C h in a 5.010 5.680 5 3.990 4.290 5
Ta iw a n 1.950 2.740 0 1.680 2.300 0
H o n g K o n g 0 0 0 0 0 0
In d o n e s ia 5.060 2.160 5 4.970 2.050 5
J a p a n 0 0 0 0 0 0
K o r e a 6.130 3.290 8 5.170 3.030 5
M ex ic o 3.570 6.090 0 2.600 4.940 0
N ew Z e a la n d 3.110 2.440 5 3.110 2.440 5
P e ru 0 0 0 0 0 0
P h i l ip p in e s 1.660 1.790 1 1.560 1.510 1
P a p u a N ew G u in e a 0.270 2.020 0 0.090 0.670 0
R u s s ia 1.040 2.150 0 0.450 1.350 0
S in g a p o r e 0 0 0 0 0 0
U SA 1.580 2.320 0 1.510 2.180 0
V ie t n am 0.380 1.680 0 0.270 1.070 0
These averages can however conceal signiﬁcant disparities at the product
level. A list of the HS categories and ex out for which the members have pro-
vided a reduction in tariﬀs is provided in the appendix. We observe important
individual reductions in China (up to 30 percentage points for one product, a
reduction of 20 percentage point for another products and roughly 10 percent-
age points for another two). Mexico has reduced tariﬀs by 10 percentage points
7Descriptive statistics are computed over all independent tariﬀ lines, including ex outs
for boh years. As mentioned above, the tariﬀ commitments of Malaysia and Thailand are
still under negotiation.
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Table 2:
D iﬀ e r e n c e M e a n D iﬀ e r e n c e S t d .D e v .
A u s t r a l i a 0 0
B ru n e i 0 0
C a n a d a 0.100 0.619
C h i l e 1 0
C h in a 1.030 3.428
Ta iw a n 0.270 1.361
H o n g K o n g 0 0
In d o n e s ia 0.090 0.678
J a p a n 0 0
K o r e a 0.960 1.400
M ex ic o 0.960 2.840
N ew Z e a la n d 0 0
P e ru 0 0
P h i l ip p in e s 0.090 0.519
P a p u a N ew G u in e a 0.180 1.348
R u s s ia 0.590 1.771
S in g a p o r e 0 0
U SA 0.070 0.366
V ie t n am 0.110 0.750
for as many as 22 ex outs. Russia has a tariﬀ reduction of 7.5 percentage points
for three products.
Table 3 considers the signiﬁcance of the products for which concessions have
been made. We do not have trade data the level of the ex outs but only at the
HS 6 level. Hence, we assume that whenever a concession has been granted for
an ex out within an HS6 category, the concession applies to the overall value
of trade within the HS category. This is a very conservative assumption which
biases upwards our assessment of the signiﬁcance of the concessions. We observe
that the product category in which concessions have been made account for less
than six percent of overall imports in all countries concerned8 .
Table 3: Overall imports impacted by tariﬀ reduction, as percentage of total
imports
Country % tot imports
Canada 0.117
Chile 2.53
China 2.53
Indonesia 0.041
Korea 5.995
Mexico 2.298
Philippines 0.027
Russia 1.114
USA 0.058
Vietnam 0.18
In order to further assess the signiﬁcance of the concessions oﬀered by the
8We consider overall imports of the products in which concessions have been made and
not only the imports from the APEC members as tariﬀ reductions are applied on a MFN
basis.
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members, we consider, for each member, the value of imports for which it has
provided a concession as a percentage of the value of trade on which concessions
could have been granted in the context of the agreeement. This is measured
by the value of trade for which the import tariﬀs were strictly positive in 2015.
Result can be found in table 4, which also reports the weighted average reduction
in the tariﬀ (namely the reduction in tariﬀs, in percentage points, weighted by
the share of the value of imports that the product accounted for in 2015 in total
imports of products in the APEC list for which tariﬀs were strictly positive).
We observe that Korea and Mexico have made important concessions. The
former has reduced (trade weighted) tariﬀs by 5 percentage points on almost
all goods under the agreement. Mexico has granted a 11% (trade weighted)
reduction in tariﬀs for roughly 70% of its imports. Chile provides a very modest
(1%) reduction over all categories. Russia provides a moderate reduction (2.5%)
over 50% of its imports and China a 1% reduction over 26% of its imports. At
the other extreme, the concessions of the US are symbolic.
Table 4: Total tariﬀ reductions
Country % of volumes for nonzero 2015 tariﬀs Weighed average reduction in tariﬀs
Canada 30.64 1.212
Chile 100 1
China 26.41 1.044
Indonesia 1.37 0.136
Korea 96.55 5.204
Mexico 69 11.914
Philippines 2.65 0.194
Russia 48.83 2.569
USA 1.52 0.082
Vietnam 23.28 3.432
Finally, we consider whether the concessions have been concentrated in par-
ticular product category. Table 5 presents the overall import values and trade
weighted reductions in tariﬀs per HS category.
We observe that there are few product categories for which both the trade
weighted reduction in tariﬀs and overall trade is signiﬁcant. Taking a 3% trade
weighted reduction in tariﬀs and overall trade in excess of a billion as thresholds,
we see that the impact is signiﬁcant only for "Water ﬁlters" (8421.21), "Wind
Powered electric generating sets" (8502.31 and 8502.39) an" Optical measuring
and checking instruments" (9031.49). Overall, one should thus not overestimate
the aggregate signiﬁcance of the APEC agreement.
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Table 5:
To t a l Im p o r t s Tr a d e w e ig h t e d m e a s u r e o f c o n c e s s io n
4 4 1 8 .7 2 303, 037, 827 3.661
8 4 0 2 .9 0 914, 994, 139 0.488
8 4 0 4 .1 0 363, 596, 115 0.237
8 4 0 4 .2 0 81, 718, 897 0.971
8 4 0 4 .9 0 252, 325, 448 0.678
8 4 0 6 .9 0 1, 286, 187, 538 1.389
8 4 1 1 .8 2 1, 238, 532, 920 1.800
8 4 1 1 .9 9 6, 276, 275, 496 0.256
8 4 1 2 .9 0 2, 773, 153, 711 0.453
8 4 1 7 .8 0 933, 109, 028 1.330
8 4 1 7 .9 0 750, 025, 630 0.206
8 4 1 9 .1 9 633, 480, 097 0.542
8 4 1 9 .3 9 863, 900, 838 1.358
8 4 1 9 .6 0 906, 329, 711 3.837
8 4 1 9 .8 9 3, 565, 745, 864 1.135
8 4 1 9 .9 0 2, 325, 370, 163 0.218
8 4 2 1 .2 1 2, 897, 826, 523 3.545
8 4 2 1 .2 9 2, 923, 191, 038 1.206
8 4 2 1 .3 9 7, 136, 261, 639 3.162
8 4 2 1 .9 9 3, 924, 245, 951 1.622
8 4 7 4 .2 0 1, 052, 782, 225 0.995
8 4 7 9 .8 2 1, 722, 758, 245 1.366
8 4 7 9 .8 9 17, 125, 203, 699 1.498
8 4 7 9 .9 0 5, 513, 141, 144 0.564
8 5 0 1 .6 4 1, 095, 696, 884 0.809
8 5 0 2 .3 1 1, 352, 159, 824 3.223
8 5 0 2 .3 9 1, 980, 379, 992 3.151
8 5 0 3 .0 0 5, 092, 036, 275 0.843
8 5 0 4 .9 0 3, 282, 217, 252 1.339
8 5 1 4 .1 0 982, 909, 362 0.323
8 5 1 4 .2 0 294, 475, 124 0.759
8 5 1 4 .3 0 470, 635, 019 0.098
8 5 1 4 .9 0 484, 226, 729 0.314
8 5 4 1 .4 0 25, 583, 596, 172 0.034
8 5 4 3 .9 0 2, 734, 250, 282 0.316
9 0 1 3 .8 0 49, 030, 242, 447 0.166
9 0 1 3 .9 0 5, 911, 549, 418 2.705
9 0 1 5 .8 0 1, 435, 960, 738 0.451
9 0 2 6 .1 0 1, 966, 007, 539 0.015
9 0 2 6 .2 0 3, 604, 256, 190 0.887
9 0 2 6 .8 0 990, 279, 469 0.008
9 0 2 6 .9 0 1, 623, 466, 775 0.006
9 0 2 7 .1 0 2, 180, 638, 801 0.981
9 0 2 7 .2 0 1, 405, 996, 496 0.032
9 0 2 7 .3 0 1, 413, 975, 923 0.007
9 0 2 7 .5 0 2, 849, 195, 072 0.004
9 0 2 7 .8 0 5, 138, 240, 703 0.076
9 0 2 7 .9 0 3, 216, 393, 877 0.290
9 0 3 1 .4 9 3, 710, 381, 992 3.481
9 0 3 1 .8 0 10, 574, 806, 155 0.351
9 0 3 1 .9 0 2, 811, 870, 718 0.406
9 0 3 2 .8 9 10, 180, 086, 765 0.950
9 0 3 2 .9 0 1, 869, 442, 099 0.430
9 0 3 3 .0 0 470, 110, 904 0.607
219, 498, 678, 882
4 A model of preferential tariﬀs for green goods
This section develops a model of tariﬀ setting in which a preferential treatement
can be given to green goods. It is obvious that if some "green" goods generate
positive consumption externalities, it will be attractive to provide tariﬀ conces-
sions in order to reﬂect them. In this section, we consider another feature of
tariﬀ concession, namely the extent to which they can provide incentives for
the development of green goods. The objective of the model is to investigate
whether such a policy is eﬀective in encouraging the development and imports of
green goods and identify the factors which aﬀect its optimal design. We assume
that countries initially set optimal tarifs which maximise domestic welfare. In
line with the description of the EGA and APEC above, we assume that countries
can subsequently provide a tarif discount in order to encourage foreign ﬁrms to
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invest in the production of green goods (but this opportunity is not anticipated
at the time at which the baseline tariﬀ is set). The production of the green
variant requires an investment, which takes the form of a ﬁxed sunk cost. The
imports of these green goods generate a positive externality in the importing
country. The production of green goods however does not generate any positive
externality in the exporting country, which could arise for instance through the
choice of production methods that are more environmentally friendly.
We proceed in stages. We will ﬁrst derive the outcome without green goods.
It is the subgame perfect equilibrium of a two stage game in which governments
set an import tariﬀs in the ﬁrst stage and ﬁrms compete in price in the second
stage. The market is represented as an oligopoly with symmetric product
diﬀerentiation in which domestic ﬁrms compete with foreign producers. Second,
we derive the outcome in which governments can provide a discount for green
goods. Such a policy will decrease domestic welfare in the absence of positive
external eﬀects generated by the green goods. This arises because the initial
tariﬀ level has been set to as to maximise domestic welfare and a reduction in the
tariﬀ even for a subset of ﬁrms can only reduce welfare. Rather than deriving the
optimal discount, which would naturally depend in a straightforward manner
on the value of the external eﬀects generated by green goods, we identify for
each discount a lower bound on the value of the external eﬀect that would be
required in order to justify that policy in the sense that it would keep welfare
constant. We also describe the range of values of the external eﬀect for which
the policy is feasible, i.e. for which there is a discount such that it induces
the amount of production and imports of green goods which guarantees that
welfare is constant. This range is naturally also a function of technology and
in particular the ﬁxed cost that is incurred for developing green varieties.
The outcome with the tariﬀ discount is thus the subgame perfect equilibrium
of a two stage game in which foreign ﬁrms choose in the ﬁrst stage whether
to produce a green variant of the diﬀerentiated products and such that ﬁrms
compete in price in the second stage. At the second stage, there are then three
types of ﬁrms; domestic ﬁrms which produce "brown" goods, foreign ﬁrms which
produce "brown" goods with a the optimal tariﬀ and foreign ﬁrms which produce
"green" goods with a tariﬀ discount9 .
4.1 Equilibrium without preferential tariﬀs
We assume that there are two countries A and B with nA and nB ﬁrms, respec-
tively. The ﬁrms i = 1 . . . nA are based in country A and j = 1 . . . nB in country
B. Each ﬁrms produces a diﬀerent variety of a diﬀerentiated product. The
pattern of diﬀerentiation is symmetric and the demand for each good produced
by ﬁrms from country A, indexed by i is given by the following demand system
respectively in country A and in country B ;
9 In this model, domestic ﬁrms have no incentive to swith to the production of green vari-
ants. As consumers do not have a higher willingness to pay for green goods, the only in-
centive to produce them arises from diﬀerential tariﬀs (or potentially lower domestic taxes,
that we do not consider in the present model).
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qAi =
1
nA + nB

vA − pAi − γ

pAi − 1nA + nB

 n
AX
h=1
pAh +
nBX
j=1
pAj






qBi =
1
nA + nB

vB − pBi − γ

pBi − 1nA + nB

 n
AX
h=1
pBh +
nBX
j=1
pBj






in which γ represents the degree of diﬀerentiation among products. It ranges
from 0 which corresponds to independent products to ∞ which corresponds to
homogenous goods. Similar expression would obtain for the products produced
by ﬁrm from country B (indexed by j). In this set up, each ﬁrm from each
country produces a diﬀerent variant which can be sold in both countries. This
demand system, due Shubik and Levitan (1980) has the attractive property that
the market size does not vary with the degree of substitution among products
and the number of products (ﬁrms). The proﬁt functions with ad valorem tax
are
Πi = (p
A
i − c
A)qAi + [p
B
i (1− τB)− c
A]qBi
Πj = [p
A
j (1− τA)− c
B ]qAj + (p
B
j − c
B)qBj .
respectively for ﬁrms located in country A and in country B and in which ci
refers to the marginal cost of ﬁrms located in country i. The maximization of
the proﬁt functions with respect to the prices yields the Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium p∗Ai , p
∗A
j , p
∗B
i , p
∗B
j . The system of ﬁrst order conditions is such the prices
charged by ﬁrms from a given country in their domestic market are indepen-
dent of the prices charged in the foreign market. Hence, the equilibrium in
any country can be obtained by solving the ﬁrst order conditions for the max-
imisation of the proﬁt of domestic ﬁrms with the respect to the prices in their
own market (independently of the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximisation
of their proﬁt in the foreign market) together with the ﬁrst order conditions for
the maximisation of the proﬁt of the foreign ﬁrms with respect to their prices
in the domestic market .
One can obtain analytic expressions for the equilibrium prices that can be
obtained upon request from the authors. The taxes are determined by the
governments in the ﬁrst stage:
max
τA
CSA +
nAX
i=1
Π∗i + τA
nBX
j=1
p∗Aj q
A
j (p
∗)
max
τB
CSB +
nBX
j=1
Π∗j + τB
nAX
i=1
p∗Bi q
B
i (p
∗)
with CSA, CSB the consumer surplus for the respective countries.
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Consumer utility (from which the demand functions are derived, see Shubik
and Levitan (1980)) in country A is given by
UA
X
qi,
X
qj

= vA

 n
AX
i=1
qAi +
nBX
j=1
qAj

− nA + nB
2(1 + γ)

 n
AX
i=1
qA2i +
nBX
j=1
qA2j +
+
γ
nA + nB

 n
AX
i=1
qAi +
nBX
j=1
qAj


2


So that total consumer surplus is written:
CSA = U
X
qi,
X
qj

−
nAX
i=1
qAi p
A
i −
nBX
j=1
qAi p
A
i
_
One can obtain a unique closed form solutions for the optimal taxes. The
solutions vector of the ﬁrst stage system includes three roots for each tax, two
of which are complex and therefore discarded. The explicit solutions can be
obtained upon request from the authors.
The equilibrium of the model can be illustrated for particular parameter
values. The prices of the second stage and optimal taxes are calcuated with
the following parameter values: with vA = vB = 1, cA = cB = 0.1 with
nA = nB = 2 and then equal to 5 and 10, and γ = 0, 1, 5.
Table 6. Illustration of the equilibrium without green variants
p∗Ai p
∗B
i p
∗A
j p
∗B
j τA τB
Base 0.218 0.313 0.313 0.218 0.549 0.549
γ = 0 0.219 0.336 0.336 0.219 0.6 0.6
γ = 5 0.215 0.269 0.269 0.215 0.409 0.409
nA = nB = 10 0.215 0.260 0.260 0.215 0.366 0.366
vA = vB = 5 0.233 0.569 0.569 0.233 0.811 0.811
vA = 1, vB = 0.5 0.218 0.313 0.262 0.215 0.549 0.374
We observe, as one would expect that the prices are higher the higher is
the degree of product diﬀerentiation (the lower is γ). In addition, a lower
concentration leads to lower prices. The optimal taxes also fall as the degree
of product diﬀerentiation falls. This arise because the government’s ability
to extract rents from foreign ﬁrms is reduced as competition is more intense;
an import tax can be seen as an increase in the marginal cost of foreign ﬁrms.
With more substitution between products, an increase in the cost of foreign ﬁrms
will have a stronger beneﬁcial eﬀect on the proﬁt of domestic ﬁrm (as consumers
switch to domestic products) and a weaker (negative) eﬀect on consumer surplus
but tax revenues will also be more sensitive (as the output of foreign ﬁrms falls
11
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more quickly). Overall, the optimal taxes fall. Finally, as the market becomes
more proﬁtable (the intercept increases relative to marginal cost), the optimal
tax increases.
4.2 Equilibriumwith preferential tariﬀs for “Green Goods”
In this section, we present the model with a preferential tariﬀ for "green goods".
The demand system has nA ﬁrms based in A, and nB ﬁrms based in B, both
selling in market A. Out of the nB ﬁrms in B, nGB produce a “green” variant
of their diﬀerentiated product and nBB = nB − nGB sell a “ brown” variant of
their diﬀerentiated good. The demand system for the three types of products
sold in country A (domestic, foreign brown variant and foreing green variants),
is as before
qAi =
1
nA + nB

vA − pAi − γ

pAi − 1nA + nB

 n
AX
h=1
pAh +
nGBX
j=1
pGAj +
nB−nGBX
k=1
pBAk






qGAj =
1
nA + nB

vA − pGAj − γ

pGAj − 1nA + nB

 n
AX
h=1
pAh +
nGBX
m=1
pGAm +
nB−nGBX
k=1
pBAk






qBAk =
1
nA + nB

vA − pBAk − γ

pBAk − 1nA + nB

 n
AX
h=1
pAh +
nGBX
m=1
pGAm +
nB−nGBX
n=1
pBAn






for i = 1 . . . nA, j = 1 . . . nGB , k = 1 . . . (nB − nGB). Note that in terms of
demand, there is no diﬀerence between the green and the brown variants of
the diﬀerentiated product of the foreign ﬁrm (the demand system is completely
symmetric). The proﬁt functions are:
Πi = (p
A
i − c
A)qAi
ΠGj = [p
GA
j (1− α τA)− c
B ]qGAj − φ
ΠBk = [p
BA
j (1− τA)− c
B ]qBAk
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the tax discount for the ﬁrms that produce the green
good and φ > 0 is the ﬁxed cost incurred by the foreign ﬁrms that decide to
produce a green variant. The second stage yields the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
p∗Ai , p
∗GA
j , p
∗BA
k by maximizing the proﬁt functions.
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms n∗GB that produce the green good is given
by a free "transformation" condition. It is such that the proﬁt of a "green"
variant and a "brown" variant are identical.
ΠGj (τB , α, φ, c
A, cB , vA, γ, nA, n
B , n∗GB) = ΠBk (τB , c
A, cB , vA, γ, nA, n
B , n∗GB)
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The existence of a single solution for the number of green variants is guaranteed
by the fact that the proﬁt of ﬁrms having chosen to produce a green variant
(green ﬁrms for short) are more sensitive to the entry of green ﬁrms than the
proﬁt of brown ﬁrms. Assume that the proﬁt of a green ﬁrm is larger than
proﬁt of a brown ﬁrm when the ﬁrst ﬁrm decides to produce a green variant10 .
The external eﬀect that the second green ﬁrm exercises on the proﬁt of the
existing green ﬁrm is larger than the external eﬀect that it exercises on a brown
ﬁrm. This arises because green ﬁrms, having the same tax and hence the same
marginal cost, are closer competitor to one another than they are to brown ﬁrms.
As a consequence, the proﬁt of green ﬁrms fall faster than the proﬁt of brown
ﬁrms as the number of green ﬁrm increases. There is a single crossing point
between the proﬁt of green ﬁrms and the proﬁt of brown ﬁrms as functions of the
number of green ﬁrms. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 1 for particular parameter
values. The blue line represents the proﬁt of green ﬁrms whereas the brown
line represents the proﬁt of brown ﬁrms, as a function of the number of green
ﬁrms in the market.
The existence of an interior solution for the number of green ﬁrms will then
also depend on the value of the ﬁxed cost. If the ﬁxed cost is too large, even
the ﬁrst ﬁrm to become green would obtain less proﬁt that a brown ﬁrm and
none will switch. There will be a corner solution with no green ﬁrm. At the
opposite, if the ﬁxed cost is very small, all ﬁrms will prefer to become green and
there is a corner solution with no brown ﬁrm.
It is worth considering how for a given ﬁxed cost a change in the discount
aﬀects the green output. There are two eﬀets at play which reinforce each other.
10 In the opposite case, there will be a corner solution such that no ﬁrm is choosing to
become green.
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An increase in the discount (a fall in α) will induce more ﬁrms to produce a
green variant because the proﬁt per green ﬁrm increases. However, it will also
increase the output per green ﬁrm (as the discounts increases relative market
access).
Finally, the welfare function in A as a function of the discount α will be the
sum of the consumer surplus in A, proﬁts of ﬁrms from A and all tax revenues
from brown and green ﬁrms :
W (τA, α) = CSA+
nAX
i=1
Π∗i + τA

α
nGBX
j=1
p∗GAj q
GA
j (p
∗) +
nB−nGBX
k=1
p∗BAk q
BA
j (p
∗)


The utility for A is written:
UA
X
qi,
X
qj ,
X
qk

= vA

 n
AX
i=1
qAi +
nGBX
j=1
qGAj +
nB−nGBX
k=1
qBAj


−
nA + nB
2(1 + γ)

 n
AX
i=1
(qAi )
2 +
nGBX
j=1
(qGAj )
2 +
nB−nGBX
k=1
(qBAk )
2+
+
γ
nA + nB

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AX
i=1
qAi +
nGBX
j=1
qGAj +
nB−nGBX
k=1
qBAk


2


So that the Consumer Surplus (utility minus all the total expenditures for goods
sold in country A by ﬁrms i of A, by green ﬁrms j and brown ﬁrms k ) is given
by :
CSA = UA
X
qi,
X
qj ,
X
qk

−
nAX
i=1
qAi p
A
i −
nGBX
j=1
qGAj p
GA
j −
nB−nGBX
k=1
qGAk p
GA
k
4.3 Discussion of the preferential tariﬀ
The ability to encourage the entry of green ﬁrms will naturally be constrained
by the ﬁxed cost that is incurred to invest into green goods. More precisely,
for any discount in the tariﬀ α, there is a range ﬁxed cost φ for which entry can
be encouraged. The upper bound of this range corresponds to the entry of a
single green ﬁrm and the lower bound corresponds to a switch of all brown ﬁrms
into a green variant. There is thus only some many green ﬁrms than can be
encouraged with a given tariﬀ discounts, depending on the ﬁxed cost. When
the ﬁxed cost are high, higher tariﬀ discounts are required to induce ﬁrms to
produce green variants.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which represents for diﬀerent values of α the
range of ﬁxed cost for which the entry of green ﬁrms can be encouraged (this
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picture is drawn for our base case case in terms of parameters)11 . As one can
see, a higher discount (a lower α) will induce the entry of green ﬁrms for a higher
range of ﬁxed cost. For each α,the leftmost point of the range corresponds to
the switch of all ﬁrms (10 in the particular parameter conﬁguration) to green
variants. The rigthmost point corresponds to the switch a single ﬁrm to a green
variant, so that for each α, the ﬁgure presents the range of ﬁxed cost for which
there is an interior solution12 .
We now consider the welfare consequences of the policy inducing the devel-
opment of green ﬁrms. As discussed above, any tariﬀ discount will induce a
reduction in welfare, taken as the sum of taxes, consumer and producer surplus
(and thereby ignoring the positive external eﬀect induced by the consumption
of green goods). The following picture represents the change in welfare (in %),
between the equilbrium without concessions and the equilbrium in which green
ﬁrms are encouraged to enter, on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis,
we ﬁnd the tariﬀ discount ranging from a high discount equal ( α = 0.5) on
the lower corner to a low discount (α = 0.985) in the upper part. The other
horizontal axis presents the range of ﬁxed cost, for any given discount, which
induces respectively all ﬁrms to switch to a green variant at the extreme left to
a situation in which none of the ﬁrm is induced to invest into a green variant
at the extreme right (φ(α) → (nB − nGB)). The two variables on the two
horizontal axis are thus not independent. For each α there is a diﬀerent range
of ﬁxed cost for which zero to 10 ﬁrms (for the base case parameter constellation
underlying the ﬁgure, which has 10 ﬁrms in country B) are induced to become
green.
We observe that for any α, inducing the entry of more green ﬁrms, (over
the range over which it is feasible) induces a higher reduction in welfare (in
% terms). Indeed, the surface increases as one moves to the left for a given
11The value of the ﬁxed cost on this horizontal axis has been rescaled for the purpose of
ﬁtting the diﬀerent ranges on the same graph. It should thus be interpreted as a ﬁxed cost
index
12Of course, for any given discount, a value fo the ﬁxed cost below the leftmost part of
the range will involve a corner solution, in which all ﬁrms switch to green production, but in
which the output of foreign (green) ﬁrms increase at the expense of domestic ﬁrms.
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discount (along a ray perpendicular to α). The ﬁgure also illustrates that
lower discounts will in general induce lower welfare losses (as the surface slopes
downwards as one moves along a ray perpendicular to φ). This accords with
intuition that a smaller distortion induces a lower welfare loss but of course, as
mentioned above, a lower distortions can induce entry of green ﬁrms only for a
range of lower ﬁxed cost.
The following ﬁgure presents the change in welfare for diﬀerent values of γ.
The upper surface is drawn for a lower value of γ, i.e., a higher degree of
product diﬀerentiation. We observe for any tariﬀ discount (and associated
range of ﬁxed cost) the reduction in welfare increase as there is more product
diﬀerentiation. This arises presumably because the proﬁt of ﬁrms that are more
diﬀerentiated is less sensitive to a tariﬀ discount so that the instrument is less
eﬀective.
By inducing the entry of green ﬁrms, tariﬀ discounts will thus generate
consumption externalities. Tariﬀ concessions can be justiﬁed when the loss
of welfare (deﬁned as the sum of producer surplus, consumer suplus and tax
revenues) is compensated by the externalities. We assume that the externalities
are proportional to the consumption of green goods and we identify for each
value of the externality generated by unit of consumption of the green good,
17
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and for a given technology (as represented by the ﬁxed cost of producing a green
variant), the policy that will at least keep the country as well oﬀ (considering
both welfare and the beneﬁt from the externality). This broader notion of
welfare, which can be though out as some social welfare), is constant when the
loss of welfare per unit of consumption of the green good is equal to the value of
the externality generated by one unit of consumption of the green good. Hence,
we consider how equilibrium outcomes which involve a given reduction in welfare
per unit of green good can be induced. This will also identify for any given value
of the externality generated by one unit of green good, the policy that would
be worthwhile for the country concerned (if feasible, given the technology).
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 5, in which the unit value of the externality (or
equivalenty the change in welfare per unit of green good) is on the vertical axis
and the ﬁxed cost is on the horizontal axis. Each of the functions on the
ﬁgure represents the change of welfare per unit of green good in an interior
equilibrium as a function the ﬁxed cost for a given value of the discount (α).
For each function, the left most point corresponds to the ﬁxed cost such that
the maximum number of ﬁrms is induced to switch to a green variant (10 ﬁrms
for this particular parameter conﬁguration). The rightmost point correspond
to the ﬁxed cost for which a single ﬁrm is induced to switch to a green variant.
We observe that this function is increasing; even though (as observed above),
the change in welfare, for a given discount, is larger when more ﬁrms are induced
to become green, the change in welfare per unit of green output actually falls
when the number of green ﬁrms increases. As there are more green ﬁrms, they
all produce more green output and even tough the welfare loss increases, the
18
Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Neven
welfare loss per unit of green output actually falls.
The three function in this ﬁgure correspond to increasing values of the dis-
count (decreasing values of (α). As a higher discount is granted, the leftmost
point (corresponding to 10 green ﬁrms) is naturally achieved for a higher value
of the ﬁxed cost. The blue curve (to the right) thus corresponds to the highest
discount (0.5 for the parameter conﬁguration used for the graph). We also
observe that the functions never intersect; this implies that for any given ﬁxed
cost, there is a single value of the discount (and associated number of green
ﬁrms) for which the loss of welfare due to the discount is equal to the external
eﬀect generated by the green output. Consider for instance the blue function
on the graph which corresponds to α = 0.5 and compare it with the function
immediately to its left, which is drawn for a lower discount (a higher α). It
will be everywhere to the left. This implies that there is a single function
(corresponding to a particular value of α) that goes through any point in this
graph (any combination of ﬁxed cost (on the horizontal axis) and value of the
externality (per unit, on the vertical axis)), if at all. Hence, if the value of the
ﬁxed cost allows it, there is a single policy which leaves the importing country
indiﬀerent in terms of social welfare (such that the loss of welfare is exactly
compensated by the external eﬀects generated by the green good). As the
ﬁxed cost falls, for a given value of the external eﬀect, the value of the discount
that leaves the country indiﬀerent falls (α increases). This arises because as the
ﬁxed cost falls, more green ﬁrms enter, leading to a higher level of green output
but also higher welfare cost (in particular because the tariﬀ revenue falls). It
is then optimal to reduce the discount, which will reduce the output per green
ﬁrm and readjust the number of green ﬁrms. Intuitively, as the policy instru-
ment becomes more eﬀective, less of it has to be used in order to reach a given
objective.
Another implication of this analysis is that starting from the policy that
leaves the country indiﬀerent, an increase in the discount will always be attrac-
tive (will increase social welfare) up to point where all brown ﬁrm have switched
to producing a green variant. Consider a particular value of the ﬁxed cost and
of the externality, for which a given α will ensure that the country is indiﬀer-
ent. An increase in the discount will lead to a welfare cost per unit of green
output which is lower (one moves to a function, for a higher discount, which
is everywhere below, within the range for which the function is deﬁned). As
there is a wedge between the welfare cost per unit of green output and the ex-
ternality per unit of green output, social welfare increases. It is then attractive
to increase the discount up to point where all ﬁrms have switched to a green
variant. Graphically, for a given ﬁxed cost, this will be the value of the discount
for which the function on the graph above becomes deﬁned (its leftmost point).
Hence, it appears that when ﬁxed costs allow for the transformation of brown
to green ﬁrms, it is always best to choose the discount such that all ﬁrms become
green. The optimal solution is thus a corner solution involving a shift of the
entire foreign industry into green variant. The welfare cost of a unit of green
ouput falls as one induces more green ﬁrms. This is presumably associated with
the beneﬁt of competition that more green ﬁrms entails. As there are more
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green ﬁrms, competition between them increases, which reduces their margins,
so that a smaller fraction of the market access beneﬁt is appropriated by the
foreign ﬁrms.
We have explored a range of parameter values13 to conﬁrm these insights.
We found that the welfare cost per unit of green output is systematically in-
creasing in the ﬁxed cost, for any given discount and that higher discounts for
any given ﬁxed cost lead to a lower level of welfare cost per unit of green output
(up to the point where all ﬁrms have switched to green variants). We ﬁnd
that that as the degree of product diﬀerentation falls (γ increases) or the num-
ber of ﬁrms increases, the welfare cost per unit of green output falls for any
given discount. This arises presumably because greater homogeneity and less
concentration lead to lower margins. Inducing green output is then less costly
(for a given discount) because a smaller proportion of the tariﬀ concession is
appropriated by foreign ﬁrms.
5 APEC and EGA in the WTO
This section discusses how the APEC and EGA initiatives ﬁt into the WTO.
We discuss in particular the legal status of the tariﬀ commitments under these
agreements and the reasons that may have prompted members to choose tariﬀ
concessions instead of the traditional route of regulation and non disrimination,
as a policy tool.
During most of the GATT-era, revealed preferences would take the form of
domestic policies14 . The advantage was that they would be unilaterally deﬁned,
and negotiations would not be burdened as the only discipline they had to
observe was non discrimination. Non discrimination served as an insurance
policy against concession erosion. Thus, trading partners would maintain their
incentive to continue negotiating their tariﬀ down, safe in the knowledge that the
outcome of their negotiation would not be undone through subsequent unilateral
actions beyond their control. The drawback would be that adjudicating bodies
would have to, in case of litigation, design a non discrimination benchmark.
Non discrimination was of course, from day one legalese for nonprotectionism,
a rather elusive concept. Indeed, the GATT/WTO adjudicating bodies have
struggled with the notion.
The APEC/EGA intiatives involve a fontloading of preferences. From a
legal policy perspective, the question arises why frontload policies that until now
had usefully found their way through domestic instuments. To make matters
worse for proponents of frontloading, the very fact that a product classiﬁcation
is inserted into a schedule does not confer ipso facto legality under WTO law,
as the Appellate Body report on EC-Bananas III has made it unambiguously
13For values of γ up to 20 and for symmetric numbers of ﬁrms from 2 to 20 and for asym-
metric patterns involving a smaller number of domestic ﬁrms.
14Baldwin (1970) explains the GATT recipe for integration.
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clear. This view might disturb the ‘contractualist’, but is quite reasonable
as it is almost impossible to decide by consensus on the legality of each and
every deposited instrument at the end of a negotiating round. There is thus,
no guarantee that the concessions granted under APEC are lawful, and thus
they can be challenged before the WTO for not observing Article 3.3 of HS.
For instance, the exporter of a product within an HS classiﬁcation for which
concessions have been granted but for which the concession would not apply
could challenge the measure, arguing that its product and those beneﬁtting
from the concession are "like".
Nevertheless, a proper reading of the MFN clause should lead to the conclu-
sion that it is only discrimination by virtue of origin that is prohibited, and not
by virtue of properties of speciﬁc products that could have been produced any-
where so that such a case may be diﬃcult. Still, de facto discrimination can also
be established, if it can be shown for instance that the product classiﬁcation and
associated preferences, have the eﬀect of disriminating in favor of products from
a particular origin but the evidentiary threshold is higher. In any event, the
‘multilateralization’ of similar classiﬁcations, as evidenced through the EGA,
under negotiation at the moment of writing, should be a strong argument in
support of lawfulness of elaborate classiﬁcations.
Still, the fact that a challenge along the lines discussed above would, in all
likelihood not be successful, is not reason enough to move from unilateral ex-
pression to a negotiated agreement. And yet, the reason they might prefer to
do as much has probably to do with the uncertainty regarding the actual pa-
rameters of case law regarding national treatment. If the counterfactual to the
APEC/EGA initiatives is the current regime, where environmental taxes are
imposed behind the border, the question arises whether such taxes are WTO-
consistent or not15 . The point here is that, the implementation of the APEC
initiative (and the interest of some additional WTO members for the EGA
initiative) may be associated with increasing diﬃculty to implement the tradi-
tional route of regulation and non discrimination. It is important to observe in
this respect that the APEC tariﬀ concessions are not concerned with domestic
production with rather with consumption externalities. Indeed, the strong het-
erogeneity among APEC members with diverse production lends support to the
presumption that the concessions are not focused on domestic production and
the protection of national champions. Hence, expressing preferences through
these lower tariﬀs considerably reduces the risk to see the measure challenged
because an advantage has been conferred to domestic producers.
Art III roughly requests from WTO members to apply the same legal regime
to same facts irrespective whether they are dealing with domestic or imported
goods. Grossman et al. (2013) have reviewed the case law in this context from
the advent of the GATT until 201216 . Their conclusion is that case law is quite
erratic, and, as a result, it is diﬃcult to predict how the marginal litigation will
be resolved.
15See Horn and Mavroidis (2011)
16Compare Neven (2001) and Mavroidis (2016).
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Terms like “applied so as to aﬀord protection”, a critical term in the case
of environmental protection have been interpreted in a manner that it is hard
to decipher. In Chile-Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body held that dif-
ferential taxation is applied so as to aﬀord to protection if the tax diﬀerential
(lower tax on domestic goods, higher on imported like goods) is larger than de
minimis. If it is also substantial, then the tax diﬀerential in and of itself suﬃces
to show that the measure has been applied so as to aﬀord protection. If it is
more than de minimis, but not substantial, then the interpreter would have to
look into the design, and architecture of the contested measure in order to form
an opinion on its consistency with the relevant multilateral rules.
The Appellate Body though, did not interpret neither the term “de minimis”
nor the term “substantial”. As a result, we simply do not know when a look into
the design and architecture of the contested measure is warranted. Furthermore,
we also lack an understanding of the steps that the adjudicator needs to take
when looking into the design, and architecture of the agreement.
One can thus, understand that, expressing a preference for environmental
goods through domestic taxation (in lieu of customs duties) could be risky, espe-
cially if it subject to an review by WTO judges that do not tend to understand
the key terms in contextual manner.
By expressing the same measure through tariﬀ preferences, WTO members
might thus take less of a risk.
6 Concluding Remarks
It is worth noting at the outset that the EGA/APEC initiatives are not multi-
lateral and from that perspective are part of a trend. Indeed, since the advent
of the WTO, there has not been any successful multilateral tariﬀ negotiation.
More generally, except for the Agreements on Aid for Trade, and Trade Facili-
tation, two initiatives largely designed towards helping with development eﬀorts
of the developing countries members of the WTO, there has been no successful
multilateral negotiation for over twenty years now under the aegis of the WTO.
The various initiatives that were successfully concluded (like the Agreements on
Information Technology, ITA I, and ITA II), were de facto plurilateral agree-
ments. Participants agreed to negotiate even though the whole membership
was not in agreement to do so, and did not seek for authorization to implement
their results (as they should under the relevant provisions concerning plurilat-
eral agreements). They simply went ahead and did so when a critical mass
of members had locked in tariﬀ concessions (so as to reduce the potential for
free-riding), and further agreed to implement their results on nondiscrimina-
tory (MFN) basis. As Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) explain, the increasing
heterogeneity of the WTO membership has had an impact on the number of
multilateral agreements that can plausibly become credible negotiating items at
the WTO.
Viewed from this perspective, the APEC/EGA initiative is thus part of a
recent trend to negotiate among few. Arguably, APEC/EGA goes one step
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further than ITA I & II, since the original signatories did not even condition
the extension of the trade advantages on an MFN-basis upon ﬁrst guaranteeing
that a critical mass of producers had acceded to their arrangement. This is
of course a disturbing trend which raises questions about the role of the WTO.
These questions are however beyond the scope of this paper.
As discussed in the paper, the APEC/EGA encourage environmental pro-
tection through tariﬀ preferences. This is a signiﬁcant innovation from the
perspectives of tariﬀ determination and the expression of public policy concerns
over a particular issue.
Up until then, tariﬀ preferences were granted mostly in favour of developing
countries and did not involve any form of regulatory conditionality. Indeed,
some WTO members occasionally implemented tariﬀ preferences conditional on
regulation. The litigation on EC-Tariﬀ Preferences, where the EU conditioned
tariﬀ reduction upon adoption of policies to combat production and traﬃcking
of drugs is a case to the point. The APEC/EGA initiative nevertheless, goes
much beyond and is not conﬁned to preferences for developing countries. It is
preferences for all that produce environmental goods.
Previously, similar preferences were consistently “regulatory”. WTO mem-
bers conditioned market access upon satisfaction of market access criteria, which
could include satisfaction of domestic environmental laws. This is the natural
consequence of the fact that the nature of the GATT/WTO regime is negative
integration, and societal preferences across WTO members diﬀer for a variety
of reasons. The APEC/EGA is not a substitute, but a complement to this and
it is not unilateral anymore. Twenty-one WTO members so far have expressed
a joint preference. Many more will do so when the EGA initiative concludes.
Assuming that the questions regarding the legality of this initiative have been
overcome, and we have explained in this paper why this should be the case, the
APEC/EGA initiative will be the ﬁrst joint initiative where a preference for the
protection of common public good has taken the form of a trade instrument.
When setting their tariﬀs, APEC signatories were not thinking only of their
terms of trade, but also in terms of environmental protection. In fact, for
some participants like China, with substantial bargaining power, it seems that
the latter motive dominated the former, since it did not receive major tariﬀ
concessions from its partners with signiﬁcant market power. Indeed, the United
States made only insigniﬁcant tariﬀ concessions, as we have seen in this paper.
This observation, in and of itself, casts doubt as to whether the terms of trade
theory17 , eloquently used as the framework to explain the GATT (where tariﬀ
classiﬁcations were expressed in terms void of any regulatory content) is the
only relevant framework in a world where the level of tariﬀs agreed is often the
expression of mixed motives (in our case, environmental concerns, as well as the
continuing strive to improve terms of trade).
17See Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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Table 6: Canada
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 4 1 1 .8 2 8 4 1 1 .8 2 .9 0 5 5
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .1 0 3 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .2 0 6 .5 1 .5
Table 7: Chile
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 6 1
8 4 0 2 .9 8 4 0 2 .9 6 1
8 4 0 4 .1 8 4 0 4 .1 6 1
8 4 0 4 .2 8 4 0 4 .2 6 1
8 4 0 4 .9 8 4 0 4 .9 6 1
8 4 0 6 .9 8 4 0 6 .9 6 1
8 4 1 1 .8 2 8 4 1 1 .8 2 6 1
8 4 1 1 .9 9 8 4 1 1 .9 9 6 1
8 4 1 2 .9 8 4 1 2 .9 6 1
8 4 1 7 .8 8 4 1 7 .8 6 1
8 4 1 7 .9 8 4 1 7 .9 6 1
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 6 1
8 4 1 9 .3 9 8 4 1 9 .3 9 6 1
8 4 1 9 .6 8 4 1 9 .6 6 1
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 6 1
8 4 1 9 .9 8 4 1 9 .9 6 1
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 6 1
8 4 2 1 .2 9 8 4 2 1 .2 9 6 1
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 6 1
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 .9 9 6 1
8 4 7 4 .2 8 4 7 4 .2 6 1
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 6 1
8 4 7 9 .8 9 8 4 7 9 .8 9 6 1
8 4 7 9 .9 8 4 7 9 .9 6 1
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 .6 4 6 1
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 6 1
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 6 1
8 5 0 3 8 5 0 3 6 1
8 5 0 4 .9 8 5 0 4 .9 6 1
8 5 1 4 .1 8 5 1 4 .1 6 1
8 5 1 4 .2 8 5 1 4 .2 6 1
8 5 1 4 .3 8 5 1 4 .3 6 1
8 5 1 4 .9 8 5 1 4 .9 6 1
8 5 4 1 .4 8 5 4 1 .4 6 1
8 5 4 3 .9 8 5 4 3 .9 6 1
9 0 1 3 .8 9 0 1 3 .8 6 1
9 0 1 3 .9 9 0 1 3 .9 6 1
9 0 1 5 .8 9 0 1 5 .8 6 1
9 0 2 6 .1 9 0 2 6 .1 6 1
9 0 2 6 .2 9 0 2 6 .2 6 1
9 0 2 6 .8 9 0 2 6 .8 6 1
9 0 2 6 .9 9 0 2 6 .9 6 1
9 0 2 7 .1 9 0 2 7 .1 6 1
9 0 2 7 .2 9 0 2 7 .2 6 1
9 0 2 7 .3 9 0 2 7 .3 6 1
9 0 2 7 .5 9 0 2 7 .5 6 1
9 0 2 7 .8 9 0 2 7 .8 6 1
9 0 2 7 .9 9 0 2 7 .9 6 1
9 0 3 1 .4 9 9 0 3 1 .4 9 6 1
9 0 3 1 .8 9 0 3 1 .8 6 1
9 0 3 1 .9 9 0 3 1 .9 6 1
9 0 3 2 .8 9 9 0 3 2 .8 9 6 1
9 0 3 2 .9 9 0 3 2 .9 6 1
9 0 3 3 9 0 3 3 6 1
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Table 8: China
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 7 2
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 1 0 2 0 1 0 5
8 4 0 4 .2 0 8 4 0 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 9
8 4 0 4 .9 0 8 4 0 4 9 0 1 0 1 0 5
8 4 0 4 .9 0 8 4 0 4 9 0 9 0 7 2
8 4 1 2 .9 0 8 4 1 2 9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 1 7 .8 0 8 4 1 7 8 0 5 0 1 0 5
8 4 1 7 .9 0 8 4 1 7 9 0 9 0 7 2
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 1 9 1 0 3 5 3 0
8 4 1 9 .3 9 8 4 1 9 3 9 9 0 9 4
8 4 1 9 .6 0 8 4 1 9 6 0 9 0 1 0 5
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 2 1 1 0 2 5 2 0
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 3 9 1 0 1 5 1 0
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 9 9 1 0 1 0 5
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 8 2 0 0 7 2
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 6 4 1 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 6 4 2 0 5 .8 0 .8
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 6 4 3 0 6 1
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 3 1 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 3 9 0 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 3 .0 0 8 5 0 3 0 0 9 0 8 3
8 5 0 4 .9 0 8 5 0 4 9 0 9 0 8 3
9 0 1 3 .9 0 9 0 1 3 9 0 9 0 8 3
9 0 2 7 .1 0 9 0 2 7 1 0 0 0 7 2
9 0 3 1 .4 9 9 0 3 1 4 9 1 0 1 0 5
9 0 3 2 .8 9 9 0 3 2 8 9 9 0 7 2
9 0 3 3 .0 0 9 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 6 1
Table 9: ChinaTaipei
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 4 1 2 .9 0 8 4 1 2 .9 0 .0 0 6 .8 1 .8
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 .6 4 .1 0 8 .5 8 .5
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 .6 4 .9 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .0 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .1 0 1 0 1 0
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .9 0 1 0 5
Table 10: Indonesia
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .2 0 .0 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .3 1 .0 0 1 0 5
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .3 9 .0 0 1 0 5
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Table 11: Korea
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 1 0 0 0 8 3
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 2 .9 0 8 4 0 2 .9 0 1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 2 .9 0 8 4 0 2 .9 0 2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 .1 0 1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 .1 0 2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 .1 0 3 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 .1 0 .4 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .1 0 8 4 0 4 .1 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .2 0 8 4 0 4 .2 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .9 0 8 4 0 4 .9 0 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .9 0 8 4 0 4 .9 0 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 4 .9 0 8 4 0 4 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 1 .8 2 8 4 1 1 .8 2 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 1 1 .9 9 8 4 1 1 .9 9 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 2 .9 0 8 4 1 2 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 7 .8 0 8 4 1 7 .8 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 7 .9 0 8 4 1 7 .9 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 .0 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .3 9 8 4 1 9 .3 9 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .6 0 8 4 1 9 .6 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .9 0 2 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .9 0 3 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .9 0 4 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .9 0 8 4 1 9 .9 0 .9 0 1 0 8 3
8 4 1 9 .9 0 8 4 1 9 .9 0 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .9 0 1 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .2 9 8 4 2 1 .2 9 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .2 9 8 4 2 1 .2 9 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .9 0 1 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 .9 9 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 .9 9 .9 0 1 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 .9 9 .9 0 2 0 8 3
8 4 2 1 .9 9 8 4 2 1 .9 9 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .3 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .4 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 9 8 4 7 9 .8 9 .9 0 1 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .8 9 8 4 7 9 .8 9 .9 0 9 9 8 3
8 4 7 9 .9 0 8 4 7 9 .9 0 .9 0 4 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .9 0 8 4 7 9 .9 0 .9 0 5 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .9 0 8 4 7 9 .9 0 .9 0 6 0 8 3
8 4 7 9 .9 0 8 4 7 9 .9 0 .9 0 9 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .3 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .4 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .1 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .2 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .3 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .4 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 0 3 .0 0 8 5 0 3 .0 0 .2 0 9 0 8 3
8 5 0 4 .9 0 8 5 0 4 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 1 4 .1 0 8 5 1 4 .1 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 1 4 .2 0 8 5 1 4 .2 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 1 4 .3 0 8 5 1 4 .3 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 1 4 .9 0 8 5 1 4 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
8 5 4 3 .9 0 8 5 4 3 .9 0 .9 0 9 0 8 3
9 0 1 3 .8 0 9 0 1 3 .8 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 3 .9 0 9 0 1 3 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .1 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .2 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .3 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .4 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .5 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 2 7 .1 0 9 0 2 7 .1 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 2 7 .9 0 9 0 2 7 .9 0 .1 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 2 7 .9 0 9 0 2 7 .9 0 .9 0 9 1 8 3
9 0 3 1 .4 9 9 0 3 1 .4 9 .4 0 9 0 8 3
9 0 3 1 .4 9 9 0 3 1 .4 9 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 3 1 .8 0 9 0 3 1 .8 0 .9 0 9 9 8 3
9 0 3 1 .9 0 9 0 3 1 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 3 2 .8 9 9 0 3 2 .8 9 .9 0 9 0 8 3
9 0 3 2 .9 0 9 0 3 2 .9 0 .9 0 0 0 8 3
9 0 3 3 .0 0 9 0 3 3 .0 0 .0 0 0 0 8 3
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Table 12: Mexico
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 .0 2 1 5 1 0
8 4 1 7 .8 0 8 4 1 7 .8 0 .0 4 1 5 1 0
8 4 1 7 .8 0 8 4 1 7 .8 0 .0 5 1 5 1 0
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 .0 2 1 0 5
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 .0 3 1 0 5
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .0 3 1 5 1 0
8 4 1 9 .8 9 8 4 1 9 .8 9 .1 5 1 5 1 0
8 4 2 1 .2 9 8 4 2 1 .2 9 .0 3 1 5 1 0
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .0 1 1 5 1 0
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .0 4 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .0 1 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .0 2 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .0 3 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .0 5 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .0 6 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 4 .2 0 8 4 7 4 .2 0 .9 9 1 0 5
8 4 7 9 .8 2 8 4 7 9 .8 2 .0 5 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 9 .8 9 8 4 7 9 .8 9 .0 3 1 5 1 0
8 4 7 9 .8 9 8 4 7 9 .8 9 .1 9 1 5 1 0
8 5 0 1 .6 4 8 5 0 1 .6 4 .0 3 1 5 1 0
8 5 0 2 .3 1 8 5 0 2 .3 1 .9 9 1 5 1 0
8 5 0 2 .3 9 8 5 0 2 .3 9 .0 4 1 5 1 0
8 5 1 4 .1 0 8 5 1 4 .1 0 .0 4 1 0 5
8 5 1 4 .2 0 8 5 1 4 .2 0 .0 5 1 0 5
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .0 2 1 5 1 0
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .0 6 1 5 1 0
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .0 7 1 0 5
9 0 1 5 .8 0 9 0 1 5 .8 0 .9 9 1 0 5
9 0 2 6 .2 0 9 0 2 6 .2 0 .0 4 1 5 1 0
Table 13: Philippines
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 4 0 4 .2 0 8 4 0 4 .2 0 .0 0 1 0 5
8 4 1 7 .8 0 8 4 1 7 .8 0 .0 0A 7 2
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .1 1 7 2
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .1 9 7 2
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .2 2 7 2
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .2 3 7 2
Table 14: PapuaNewGuinea
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 .0 0 1 5 1 0
Table 15: Russia
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 .0 0 0 .0 1 1 1 1
8 4 0 2 .9 0 8 4 0 2 .9 0 .0 0 0 .9 7 .5 7 .5
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .1 0 0 .0 6 .3 6 .3
8 4 1 2 .9 0 8 4 1 2 .9 0 .2 0 0 .1 7 .5 7 .5
8 4 1 2 .9 0 8 4 1 2 .9 0 .8 0 0 .1 7 .5 7 .5
8 4 1 9 .6 0 8 4 1 9 .6 0 .0 0 0 .0 5 5
8 4 2 1 .3 9 8 4 2 1 .3 9 .8 0 0 .2 4 .7 2 .7
8 5 4 1 .4 0 8 5 4 1 .4 0 .1 0 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
8 5 4 3 .9 0 8 5 4 3 .9 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 .7 1 .7
9 0 2 6 .2 0 9 0 2 6 .2 0 .4 0 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
9 0 2 6 .2 0 9 0 2 6 .2 0 .8 0 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
9 0 2 7 .2 0 9 0 2 7 .2 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 .7 1 .7
9 0 2 7 .8 0 9 0 2 7 .8 0 .0 5 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
9 0 2 7 .8 0 9 0 2 7 .8 0 .9 9 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
9 0 2 7 .9 0 9 0 2 7 .9 0 .1 0 0 .0 3 3
9 0 2 7 .9 0 9 0 2 7 .9 0 .5 0 0 .0 3 .3 3 .3
9 0 2 7 .9 0 9 0 2 7 .9 0 .8 0 0 .0 5 2
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Table 16: USA
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
4 4 1 8 .7 2 4 4 1 8 .7 2 .9 5 8 3
8 4 0 4 .2 0 8 4 0 4 .2 0 .0 0 5 .6 0 .6
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .2 0 6 .7 1 .7
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .3 0 6 .7 1 .7
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .4 0 6 .7 1 .7
8 4 0 6 .9 0 8 4 0 6 .9 0 .4 5 6 .7 1 .7
Table 17: Vietnam
H S 6 H S 8 2 0 1 5 Ta r iﬀ (% ) C h a n g e (% )
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 .1 0 1 0 5
8 4 1 9 .1 9 8 4 1 9 .1 9 .9 0 1 0 5
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .1 1 1 0 5
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .1 9 1 0 5
8 4 2 1 .2 1 8 4 2 1 .2 1 .2 3 1 0 5
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